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THE LABOR BOARD UNSETTLES THE SCALES
Harry L. Browne*
I. Introduction
Much is heard these days about free collective bargaining and whether
it can survive in our advanced technological society. In the context of increasing
strikes and industrial strife, unless something is done to make collective bargaining work without prejudice to the national interest, it may not survive for long.
The National Labor Relations Board, the chief administrator of our labor policy,
should lend a helpful hand and advance the cause of free collective bargaining.
It may be seriously questioned, however, whether the Board has fulfilled this
responsibility. A look at the record will disclose the extent of the Board's fulfillment.
The labor policy of the United States is founded upon the principle of free
collective bargaining: voluntary labor contracts voluntarily negotiated. This
principle is firmly recognized by our labor laws. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
of 1932,' curtailing the use of the injunction by federal courts in labor disputes,
was to assure free interplay between labor on the one hand and management on
the other, with "the government... occupy[ing] a neutral position, lending its
extraordinary power neither to those who would have labor unorganized nor
to those who would organize it . . .. , The Wagner Act of 1935,' the first
comprehensive federal labor statute, embodied the "practice and procedure of
collective bargaining."4 Later amendments in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947r
* Member, Missouri Bar; B.S., Indiana University, 1934; J.D., Indiana University, 1936;
partner, Spencer, Pane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, Missouri, specializing in the practice of
labor law; former attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 1938-1948; former Chief Legal
Officer, National Labor Relations Board, 1949. Mr. Browne is the author of numerous laborlaw" articles, some of which directly concern the NLRB.
1 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
2 Remarks by Senator Robert Wagner, 75 CoNo. Rac. 4915 (1932).
3 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 '(1964).
4 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
5 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as.amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-59 (1964).
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and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 19596 reaffirmed a congressional intent to retain
free collective bargaining as our basic aim in labor-management relations.
"The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free
and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to
promote industrial peace." 7
Given a national labor policy of free collective bargaining, labor legislation
must provide a statutory framework wherein free collective bargaining in the
public interest can take place - a structure for bargaining between management
and labor on an equal footing. Experience in labor relations has shown that
excessive power inevitably results in a demonstration of that power in industrial
conflict, whereas equality of bargaining power between management and unions
leads to a realization of each side's legitimate interests. Labor legislation, therefore, has been designed to promote substantial equality in bargaining power so
that the competing interests of employers vis-a-vis organized labor can be fairly
balanced. Abuses must be curtailed in those areas of the labor-management
complex where excessive power by one side or the other can lead to labor contracts not in the public interest. As Senator Robert Taft stated in the congressional debates on the Taft-Hartley Act, unreasonable power leads to the exercise of
power "to accomplish ends which are not reasonable," and where there is a balance
of power, "neither side feels that it can make an unreasonable demand and get
away with it."' This, indeed, was the view expressed many years prior to
specific labor legislation, when the Supreme Court in American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council9 declared the need for organized or group
action by workers to "deal on equality with their employer."'" This need for
promoting equality is the scheme behind the Railway Labor Act governing railroads and airlines," and the purpose behind the Wagner Act governing other
industries affecting commerce. The Court, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,' sustained the constitutionality of the Wagner Act and declared that
"union was essential to give laborers the opportunity to deal on an equality with
their employer,"" thus affirming congressional policy as set forth in the statute's
preamble: "inequality of bargaining power" is inimical to public welfare, 4
"equality of bargaining power" is essential to industrial peace.'" Twelve years
later, believing that an imbalance had arisen in favor of organized labor, Congress
legislated again, in the Taft-Hartley Act, "to equalize legal responsibilities of
labor organizations and employers."'" Congress thus attempted to provide the
framework for free and democratic collective bargaining. It was believed that
6 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
7 Local 774, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962); see also
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 '(1952).
8 93 CONG. REc. 3835 (1947).
9 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
10 Id. at 209.
11 Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
12 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
13. Id. at 33. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), wherein the Court
stated that the theory of our labor laws "is that the making of voluntary labor agreements is
encouraged by protecting employees' rights to organize for collective bargaining and by imposing on labor and management the mutual obligation to bargain collectively." Id. at 402.
14 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
15 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
16 61 Stat. 136 '(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-59 (1964).
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by equalizing bargaining power,7 collective bargaining would be an "instrument
of peace rather than of strife?"
The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959"1 is the latest legislation designed
to equalize the bargaining power between the two parties.
That act
was the outgrowth of a hearing by the Senate Select Committee 6n
improper activities in the labor field, popularly known as the McClellan Committee. In his message to Congress on January 23, 1958, President Eisenhower
had urged that the secondary boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act be
overhauled to remove "ambiguities and inequities"" and to foreclose arbitrary
union action by limiting organizational and recognition picketing. The LandrumGriffin Act, therefore, placed statutory controls on certain union activities that
Congress believed objectionable. The act limited "blackmail picketing," where
a union seeks exclusive representation rights although it does not represent a
majority of employees; restricted "hot cargo" agreements, which permit unions
to compel contracts barring one employer from doing business with another
employer whom the union deemed "unfair"; and eliminated secondary boycott
practices, which allow unions to exert great economic pressure on disinterested
secondar employers. The whole scheme of the act was to equalize the power
balance.
The National Labor Relations Board, as before, was the administrative
agency entrusted to implement the policies of Congress; it was to be guided
not by an individual sentence taken out of context, but by the provisions read as
a whole in accordance with the statute's object and policy.2 0 However, shortly
after the passage of the Landrun-Griffin amendments and the advent of a new
national administration in 1960, the complexion of the Board members changed,
and by 1962 new appointees constituted the majority.2 An examination of Board
decisions since that time reveals a recurring failure to carry out congressional
policy. The Board has ignored its duty to "look to the reason of the enactment...
[to] inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its
design and purpose .... "22 The new Board, instead of keeping the labor-management equation in balance, has served to upset the balance that had recently been
reaffirmed in the Landrum-Griffin Act.
II. Free Collective Bargaining at the Crossroads
Industrial strife has increased to a point where many now question whether
collective bargaining can long remain free, at least in those disputes directly
affecting the national interest. Within the past few years, strikes have increased
in defense, maritime, transportation, and other industries affecting the public
welfare so that the heavy hand of the Government is already being felt in col-,
lective bargaining. In 1962, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, then Secretary of
17 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34 (1937).
18 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
19 104 CONG. Rac. 818 (1958).
20 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956).
21 Frank W. McCulloch and Gerald A. Brown, together with John H. Fanning, a holdover member, constituted the new majority. Chairman Boyd Leedom and Philip Ray Rogers

constituted the minority.
22

Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).

,-
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Labor, questioned the very concept of labor, contracts emerging from a power
struggle between management and labor, and asserted that disputes affecting
the public interest could no longer be resolved on the "old testing grounds of
'
force and power."23
The Advisory Committee to the President on LaborManagement 'Policy, in its report of May 1, 1962, declared that "the emergency
dispute provisions in the present law can and should be ,improved" and "there
was a clear need for more effective government action ... ."" This view was
shared by the then Undersecretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz.2 5 Legislative proposals were introduced dealing with labor disputes in critical industries,"' and
Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Permanent Investigations
Subcommittee, asserted that the time was "at hand for Congress to consider
whether legislative changes are needed, whether strikes that are harmful to the
public interest and which cause undue suffering and hardship to the people
should be curbed, limited, or completely prohibited.""sr Even such an advocate
of free collective bargaining as Secretary of Labor Wirtz has stated:
We stand today at what history will mark as a clear fork in the development of labor-management relations in this country. Neither the traditional collective bargaining procedures2 nor the present labor dispute laws
are working to the public satisfaction. 8
The most recent annual Bureau of Labor Statistics figures 'give cause for
concern, since more strikes were called in 1965 than in any year since 1955.29
Particularly militating against the public welfare in 1965 and 1966 were prolonged strikes in the maritime industry and in the transit and newspaper industries of New York City. 'An airline strike of forty-three days involved five major
airlines and was prolonged when, after acceptance by the carriers, the union
rejected proposals for arbitration made by the National Mediation Board,
contract proposals suggested by a Presidential emergency, board, 'and later a
23 Arthur Goldberg, speech before the Executives Club in Chicago, Feb. 23, 1962, 49
L.-R..M. 25 "(1962).
24 Report of Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, Free and Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace. 50 L.R.R.M. 11, 14, 15 (1962).

25 Address by then Undersecretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz, before the American
Management Association Personnel Conference Midwinter Meeting, 1961-1962, 49 L.R.R.M.
53 (1961).
26 E.g., in the 87th Congress, six bills and one concurrent resolution were introduced in
the Senate affecting the right to strike in the space and missile and transportation industries.
These bills were: S. 87, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1114, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961);
S. 2292, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 2401, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 2631, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S.3442, 87th sCong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. Con. Res. 85, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962). In the 1963 Congress, additional bills were introduced to curb or restrict
strikes, e.g., S. 87, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 288, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Noting that the maritime industry was responsible for approximately eight of the twenty-two
Taft-Hartley injunctions that had been issued against national emergency strikes, industry
spokesmen, in March 1963 hearin*gs on H.R. 1897, expressed misgivings that anything short
of compulsory arbitration would be effective to prevent disputes in that industry. 52 LAB.
REL. REP. 240 (1963).
27 52 LAB. REL. REP. 22 (1962).
28 WIRTz, LABOR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 49 (1964).
29 In all, 3,963 strikes involving 1,550,000 workers were started in 1965 as compared
with 3,655 stoppages and 1,640,000 workers in 1964. Idleness resulting from 1965 strikes
totaled 23.8 million man days, while 22.9 million man days were lost in 1964. There were
21 major stoppages of 10,000 workers or more begun in 1965, as opposed to 18 strikes of
such magnitude in 1964. 89 MONTHLY LAB. R. 749, 838 (1966).
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White House settlement offered for ratification. This led to a proposed Joint
Resolution by Congress for settlement of the dispute. Inter alia, it directed the
Secretary of Labor to conduct "a complete study of the operations and adequacy"
of our labor laws on settlement of labor disputes."
Although settlement of the airline strike ended the necessity for emergency
action, the failure of collective bargaining has been exposed. There are several
causes for this failure, and they must be examined, so that appropriate corrective
measures may be taken. Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth and expansion
of defense industries, and disputes in this area have a greater and more direct
impact on the public interest. Moreover, the causes giving rise to potential
labor strife have multiplied. Subjects once considered outside the realm of
collective bargaining, such as pensions, profit-sharing, bonuses, insurance plans,
subcontracting, and plant removal, have now found their way onto the bargaining table," creating new sources of division between the parties. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of labor relations generates a greater national interest
in the peaceful settlement of labor disputes within a bargaining framework.
Consequently, terms such as those relating to automation, increased' mobility
of the work force, and the "'reconciliation of high standards of living and free
trade as coordinate national objectives" 2 must be resolved by collective bargaining.
III. The Responsibility of the National Labor Relations Board
Although the issues are complex, any study in depth of the root causes
of labor strife necessitates an appraisal of Board doctrine as a point of departure. The Board is the administrator of our national labor policy, and it has
a responsibility for how it functions- go6d or bad. It can accept credit
for the successes, and it must assume responsibility for the failures. While
the jurisdiction of the Board does not extend to all industry,' each decision
of the Board is neither isolated nor sui generis. Each decision has a pervasive impact on collective bargaining and becomes a part of the whole, affecting
not only industries under Board jurisdiction, but all industry, including the
railroad and air transportation industries."3 Experience indicates that patterns
and attitudes developed in collective bargaining in one segment of oii economy
affect the whole industrial complex."4 If Board decisions have canted the
30 62 LAB. REL. REP. 119; 62 LA. REL. REP. 259; Collective Bargaining Negotiations and
1'
Contracts, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., No. 551, Part I.
31 E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago
No. W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
32 Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, address to Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 51 L.R.R.M. 78

(1962).

33 Indeed, it would appear to be in order for the Secretary of Labor, in carrying out
the proposed Joint Resolution, to examine the impact of the Board's doctrine in these respects.

See text accompanying note 30 supra.
34 However, strikes in industries under the National Labor Relations Act have more than
held their own. The increase in strike'incidence in 1965 was concentrated in manufacturing
industries, subject to the NLRA. These industries suffered 2,080 stoppages in 1965, compared to 1,794 stoppages in 1964. Significant increases in strike idleness occurred in the
paper, chemical, leather, machinery, stone, clay, and glass industries. The construction industry recorded 4.6 million man days of work stoppages in 1965. A Review of Work Stoppages
During 1965, 89 MONTHLY LAB. R. 749, 751, 752 (1966).
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sensitive balance -structured
by federal labor statutes to make free collective bargaining work in the public interest - the Board has, to the extent
of the imbalance, weakened the vitality and fabric of a precious bargaining
system. The viability and effectiveness of that system rest upon maintaining
the proper balance between the competing interests of labor and management.
How the Landrum-Griffin Act was designed to rectify union abuses has
been seen. The act attempted to create a statutory cantilever, so to speak, balancing the power of labor and management. A new Board majority, however,
established new doctrines, and within three years after the passage of that act,
Congressman Griffin, its chief architect, decried the Board's "strained and tortured reasoning," stating: "The pattern of recent decisions by the NLRB gives
rise to a serious concern that policies laid down by Congress, in the Taft-Hartley
and Landrum-Griffin Acts, are being distorted and frustrated, to say the very
least."35
These criticized decisions, creating new immunities for unions in the exercise of power and imposing new restrictions on management rights, have fomented
industrial strife, resulted in unreasonable solutions,36 and jeopardized the continued acceptability of free collective bargaining. The new doctrines, moreover,
cover the entire spectrum of labor-management relations -the organizational
stage and the determination of representation issues; the establishment of the
bargaining relationship, as well as subsequent negotiations; and finally, the interpretation of labor contracts after execution.
IV. The Creation of the Imbalance
A. Picketing
1. Organizational and Recognitional Picketing
Section 8(b) (4) prohibits strikes and secondary boycotts where an object
is:
*

(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if
another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 9 ....3

In Calumet Contractors Assn.,, a case literally falling within the prohibition
of section 8(b) (4) (C), the Board held that picketing of a construction project,
allegedly to inform the public that prevailing pay and working conditions were
not being met on the job, was so-called "area standards" picketing and lawful.
The Board reasoned:
35 108 CoNG.R c. 6194, 6191 (1962).
36 E.g., The New York Herald Tribune, a long-established newspaper in New York City,
was forced to close down by a combination of strikes by different unions, lasting 114 days.

Now that The Herald Tribune has followed The Daily Mirror to the grave, it must
be plain to everyone on both sides of the bargaining table that a lasting formula
for labor-management peace has to replace the present suicidal course - and quickly.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1966, p. 36M, col. 1.
37 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)'(C) (1964).
38 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961).
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A union may legitimately be concerned that a particular employer is undermining area standards of employment by maintaining lower standards. It
may be willing to forgo recognition and bargaining provioled subnormal
working conditions are eliminated from area considerations.3 9
However, the dissent believed that
despite the disclaimer of interest in recognition or bargaining by the Respondent picketing for a change in the prevailing rates of pay and conditions of employment agreed upon between a certified bargaining agent
and an employer constitutes an attempt to obtain conditions and concessions normally resulting from collective bargaining.4"
The Board reached its result although the union had just lost a representation election, another union had been certified, and the picketing union would
not have been able to eliminate any of the alleged subnormal working conditions
without first gaining the right to represent the employees. In a radical departure from legislative purpose,4 the Board created a loophole by which the union
could picket with impunity, furthering the abuse of economic power by unions
in representation disputes. Since the "area standards" concept is erroneous
per se, it is no answer for the Board to say that it examines the genuineness of
the union claim before providing immunity.
Calumet involved a dispute between unions. The power confirmed in Calumet was soon extended to recognitional picketing under section 8(b) (7).43 In
Claude Everett Constr. Co.' the Board held that there was no violation
of section 8(b) (7) (C), because the union was picketing, according to the
legend on its sign, to protest "substandard wages and conditions."4 The Board
found that the union's objective was to induce the company to raise its wage
scale to that prevailing in the area. Thus, the picketing was protected, despite
its interference with pickups and deliveries on the project.
The Board, in Texarkana Constr. Co.," again relied on the absence -of
an organizational or recognitional objective, holding that picketing for these
purposes only is forbidden." Before picketing, the union asked the employer
39 Id. at 512.
40 Id. at 513.
41 With respect to this decision, Congressman Griffin asserted the decision did "not
support the intent of Congress . . . [that the Board had seized upon a proviso in the Act]
to protect a purpose directly contrary to the spirit and letter of the law - namely, forcing
an employer to recognize one union while another is already certified." 108 CoNo. REc. 6192,
6194 (1962).
42 'Local 903, IBEW, 154 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 1965 CCH LAB. L. REP. 9,600; Centralia
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 1966 CCH Ln. L. REP. 1 20,025.
43 Section 8(b) (7) prohibits picketing "where an object thereof is forcing or requiring
an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization" (a) where the employer
has lawfully recognized another labor organization and a question of representation may not
appropriately be raised, (b) where a valid election had been held within the preceding
twelve months, and (c) where picketing has been conducted without a petition being
filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days. The section contains a proviso permitting publicity picketing- for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization if the picketing does not interfere with deliveries or other services. 61 Stat. 141

(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1964).
44 136 N.L.R.B. 321 '(1962).
45 Id. at 322.
46

138 N.L.R.B. 102 (1962).

47

Id. at 103.

..

,
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whether "union men" were to be employed on the project. Receiving a negative
answer, the union commenced picketing with signs stating that the employer
was "Not Paying Prevailing Wage Rate."48 Because the employer was paying
wages lower than the ratio determined under the Bacon-Davis Acte' and lower
than the picketing union's scale, the Board brushed aside the union's initial
inquiry regarding the hiring of union men and held that the union's picketing
was not for organization or representation purposes. In Keith Riggs Plumbing
& Heating Contractor," picketing was held to be a legitimate protest of substandard conditions, even though the union had solicited membership from the
employer's employees several weeks before the picketing began and several of
the employees had joined the union as a result of the picketing. "'
In Sullivan Elec. Co.,52 the Board further reduced the section 8(b) (7)
proscriptions of the act by holding them applicable only where the picketing
was for initial recognition. The Board found no violation of section 8(b) (7)
where the unions, which had first picketed against the employer's failure to adhere
to area standards, after learning there had been a contract with their district
council, picketed protesting a breach of contract. The contract had been executed
four years before, and in the intervening period the employer had had no work
in the area. But the Board stated:
[W]e are convinced that the words "recognize or bargain" [in 8(b) (7)]
were not intended to be read as encompassing two separate and unrelated
terms. Rather, we believe they were intended to proscribe picketing having
as its target forcing or requiring an employer's initial acceptance of the
union as the bargaining representative of his employees. 53
This standard was thereafter applied in Whitaker Paper Co.,54 where the
employer had charged a violation of section 8(b) (7) (G) on the ground that
a strike undertaken by a recognized union in support of a contract dispute had
been converted to unlawful recognitional picketing because the employer had
replaced the strikers. In Frank Wheatley Pump & Valve Mfr, 5 the same
situation was presented, except more than a year had elapsed from the beginuing of the economic strike when the employer withdrew recognition from the
bargaining representative. In both cases, the Board relied on the rationale of
Sullivan and dismissed the complaint, holding that where the picketing is not directed to initial acceptance as a bargaining representative, it is not proscribed.
It is submitted that Board decisions in this area simply promote industrial
strife, for they place the imprimatur of the Government on the exercise of raw
power and encourage a disregard for the peaceful procedures provided by the
48 Ibid.
49 49 Stat. 1011 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1964).
50 137 N.L.R.B. 1125 (1962).
51 The Board has also ruled that picketing to compel reinstatement of a discharged employee where another union has been certified does not violate § 8(b) (4)'(0) as it is not for a
recognitional purpose. Fanelli Ford Sales, 133 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1961). Fanelli overruled
Lewis Food Co., 115 N.L.RB. 890 (1956), in which the Board had held'that such picketing
necessarily constituted a request to bargain on that matter.
52 146 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1964).
53 Id. at 1087.
54 149 N.L.R.B. 731 (1964).
55 150 N.L.R.B. 565 (1964).
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Taft-Hartley Act. This result is particularly unfortunate, because from the time
of the original Wagner Act to the latest amendatory legislation the object of
Congress was to remove "sources of industrial strife and unrest."5 Implicit in
the statutory scheme was the premise that contests by unions or between unions
for recognition would no longer be settled by resort to strikes, boycotts, or the
picket line, because the employees themselves could determine such issues at the
ballot box. Although impasses in collective bargaining might occur that could
lead to strikes or lockouts, such stoppages would be limited to the boundaries of
the appropriate bargaining unit established by the Board. Decisions of the
Board have rendered these statutory provisions illusory.
2. Secondary Boycotts
The same decisional pattern is followed in other areas. In the Plauche Elec.,
Inc. case,5 7 the Washington Coca-Cola58 doctrine, a rule of eight years' standing
on secondary boycotts, was reversed. The history of federal labor legislation
reflects a pattern of increasing restrictions on secondary boycotts to protect
neutral and disinterested employers from being enmeshed in labor disputes. For
eight years, in keeping with this policy, the Board had interpreted the act as
making unlawful a union's engaging in common-situs picketing, that is, picketing at a construction site where employees of many contractors are on the job,
thus stopping the work of neutral contract6rs when the struck employer is doing
business within the picketed area. In the 1959 Congress, an effort had been
made by organized labor to legalize such picketing. Congress rejected the effort,
intending to retain the Board's ban on common-situs picketing.59 Yet shortly
after the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act designed to restrict picketing in
these areas, the Board opened up a new source of union power by overruling
this precedent, again thwarting congressional policy. The new rule is that the
Board will
not automatically find unlawful all picketing at the site where the employees
of the primary employer spend practically their entire working day simply
because ... they may report for a few minutes at the beginning and 6end
0
of each day to the regular place of business of the primary employer.
B. Changes in the Bargaining Unit
There have been other reversals by the Board within two or three years
after the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, all of which tended to enhance
union power. In Great Western Sugar Co., 6 1 the Board reversed. Whitmore
Labs. 2 on the question of seasonal supervisors being included in a bargaining
unit. "Seasonal supervisors" are those who exercise supervisory authority full
time for a portion of the year and perform rank-and-file functions for the remainder. The Board held: "[T]hey had supervisory status, excluding them
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

49 Stat. 449 '(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962).
107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953).
105 CoNG. REc. 17900 (1959).
Plauche Elec., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 250, 253 (1962).
137 N.L.R.B. 551 (1962).
114 N.L.R.B. 749 (1955).
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from the bargaining unit, during the period they acted as supervisors; they were
to be included for the period in which they perform rank-and-file duties.""3
Both the majority and dissent referred to congressional intent to exclude supervisors from bargaining units because of the need for supervisor loyalty to the
employer. The Board's decision undermines Congress's determination that supervisors should stay on one side of the bargaining table. In Rocky Mountain
Phosphates, Inc.," the Board reversed an established policy and held that a
certification was defeasible within a year when a certified independent union
presumably lost its majority to a national union. The Board, in Greenspan
Engraving Corp., 5 reversed Tampa Sand & Material Co.," enabling strike
replacements to vote in an election. Where strike replacements were not employed
on the eligibility date, it was held they had no right to vote. The previous rule
permitted replacements for economic strikers to vote in a representation election,
provided only they were employed on the date of the election. Pacific Tile &
Porcelain Co." reversed a rule of twenty years' standing, which had been set
forth in Dura Steel Prods. Co.,68 following the precedent established by
American Nat'l Co." The rule had been "that in determining voter eligibility a discharge will be presumed to have been for cause, unless a charge
alleging a violation of Section 8(a) (3) has been filed with this Agency."7 In
Food Haulers, Inc.,7 1 the Board reversed Pilgrim Furniture Co.,' finding that
even if a "hot cargo clause" prohibited by section 8(e) were in a contract, it
would not void the contract allowing new election.
C. Other Reversals
The highlight of Board reversals, however, occurred on February 20, 1962,
when the Board majority reopened and reconsidered four landmark cases decided one year earlier by a four to one majority, Mr. Fanning dissenting."'
Messrs. McCulloch and Brown had just been appointed to the Board. They had
not participated in the earlier Board decisions, but they reopened the cases
ostensibly in order to avoid the "criticism that inadequate deliberation or lack
of clarity attended our interpretation of the critical statutory provision."' 7 The
asserted justification for reopening, hardly borne out by the record of care and
consideration previously given to the issues involved, appears rather to have
63 137 N.L.R.B. 551, 553 (1962).
64 138 N.L.R.B. 292 '(1962).
65 137 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1962).
66 129 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1961).
67 137 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1962).
68 Ill N.L.R.B. 590 (1955).
69 27 N.L.R.B. 22 (1940).
70 Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1368 (1962).
71 136 N.L.R.B. 394 (1962).
72 128 N.L.R.B. 910 (1960).
73 C. A. Blinne Constr. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 587 (1961), aff'd as modified, 135 N.L.R.B.
1153 (1962); Stork Restaurant, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 543 (1961), aff'd as modified, 135
N.L.R.B. 1173 (1962); Crown Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. 570 (1961), rev'd, 135 N.L.R.B.
1183, enf'd, 301 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Charlton Press, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 727, rev'd,
135 N.L.R.B. 1178 '(1962). It would appear that the majority's action in voluntarily reopening previous board decisions in order to permit the new personnel to reconsider the decisions,
weakened the fabric of administrative law and the right of litigants to expect rulings according
to law, not according to men.
74 C. A. Bhinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1155 (1962).
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been designed to give the Board's new majority an opportunity to examine and
redetermine important issues on recognitional and organizational picketing
covered by the Landrum-Griffin amendments. The Board's majority, consisting
of the two new members and member Fanning, proceeded to reverse two of the
four cases outright's and dilute the remaining two by recognizing broad exceptions
to the statutory prohibitions under the permissible publicity proviso of section
8(b) (7) (0).6 The Board ruled that a meritorious unfair labor practice charge
under section 8(a) (5) will excuse a violation of section 8(b) (7) (C). The latter
requires that a union seeking representation not picket beyond a reasonable
period of time, not to exceed thirty days, without filing a representation petition.
These decisions were in the pattern enunciated by the majority of the Board
which has relaxed the legal restraints on the exercise of union power. According
to Congressman Griffin, they extended to unions an "astounding invitation...
to circumvent the law. The very theory suggested by a majority of the Board
was 7considered
and flatly rejected in the conference on the Landrurn-Griffin
Act. 7
D. The Bargaining Relationship
1. The Extent of Organization as Determinative of the Unit
The Board's acceptance of such picketing pressures is regrettable. The
practice not only does not contribute to industrial peace, but the decisions are
contrary to national policy and can only undermine free collective bargaining.
Additionally, however, the Board has rendered interpretations not concerned
directly with picketing, but that have nevertheless contributed greatly to the
power of unions. The Board now appears to establish bargaining on the basis
of a union's organizational ability rather than on other relevant factors previously
used. It will be recalled that prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board frequently
relied on "extent of union organization" as a basis for determining bargaining
units. The Taft-Hartley Act changed the rule, providing in section 9(c) (5)
that "the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controllifig."7 8
Yet in Quaker City Life Ins. Co.,7 another Board reversal, fault was found
with well-established criteria for bargaining units of insurance agents. For a
period of seventeen years, the Board had consistently held that state-wide or
company-wide units were appropriate for insurance agents50 ° The new Board,
however, reflecting the viewpoint of its current personnel, discarded the old
principles on the ground that the unions had been unable to organize on such
a basis and found smaller units to be appropriate. As stated by the Board,
"[S]tate-wide or company-wide organization has not materialized, and the result
of the rule has been to arrest the organizational development of insurance
75

C. A. Blinne Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962); Stork Restaurant, 135 N.L.R.B.

1173 (1962).
76 Charlton Press, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 1178
1183, enf'd, 301 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).

77

(1962); Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B.

108 CONG. REc. 6194 (1962). The Congressman had reference to the majority holding

that any unfair labor practice picketing would be a "publicity" defense to picketing under §

8(b)'(7) of the act, when the act specifically limited the defense to a § 8(a) (2) unfair labor
practice, as provided in § 10(l).

78 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) '(1964).
79 134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961).
80 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1944).
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agents.... 8 Quaker City thus revived the outlawed rule;" the practice continues. In Say-On Drugs, Inc.83 and Dixie Bell Mills, Inc.,84 the Board again
reversed a long line of cases that established the criteria for bargaining units
in chain stores. In Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc.,85 the Board disregarded a
retail unit embracing all stores in an administrative division of a chain or in a
geographic area, on the presumption that a single-store unit or less was appro
priate, notwithstanding all established criteria pointing to a broader unit as
appropriate. In all these cases, the unit found appeared to be based on the
2 Arnold Constable
union's extent of organization."8 In Stern's, Paramus,"
8
9
Corp.," and Lord & Taylor, the Board departed from its prior policy under
which store-wide units were considered the appropriate unit in the retail field.
It now permits separate units of selling and nonselling personnel. Finally, in
Montgomery Ward & Co.,9" the Board reversed a prior policy in order to permit
a separate unit of automotive service employees.
2.

Union Communication With Employees
It goes without saying that if unions are permitted to establish bargaining
units coextensive with their ability to organize, there can be little doubt of their
success. But now further assistance is given. Recently, the Board in Excelsior
Underwear, Inc. 1 imposed a new rule on employers, requiring them to furnish
unions with the names and addresses of employees for the purpose of facilitating
union organization, whether or not the employees wish such information disclosed. Ever since the passage of the Wagner Act, normal communication
devices available to unions were considered sufficient to enable unions to organize
employees, but in Excelsior the Board suddenly "discovered" that such means
were inadequate. The Board rejected the argument that employees would be
subject to the dangers of harrassment and coercion in their homes, refusing to
"assume" that the union "will engage in conduct of this nature." 2 This is
hardly an evenhanded application of presumption, insofar as the Board has
presumed otherwise in the case of employers interrogating their employees in
81 134 N.L.R.B. at 962.
82 The detection in any one case in which controlling effect is given to extent of union
organization is difficult, at best, since in bargaining unit cases the Board has broad discretion
and asserts that its findings are based on factors other than extent of organization. However,
in NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the issue as reflected in Quaker City and "raised an eyebrow" at the Board's
practice. The Court considered three different bargaining unit cases involving insurance agents
in which it appeared that the unit requested by the union was consistently certified by the
Board, whether it was state-wide, district-wide, or parts of each. The Court remanded the
case to the Board to "disclose the basis of its order" and to give "dear indication" that it
had properly exercised its discretion.
83 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
84 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962).
85 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 554 (1964) (dissent).
86 This case was reversed on appeal, Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d
895, 896 (7th Cir. 1965), holding that all ten of the stores, which the employer claimed
comprised the appropriate units were "alike . . . as peas in a pod." It flatly disagreed with the
Board, which upheld the union's view that a single store was appropriate.
87 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
88 150 N.L.R.B. 788 (1965).
89 150 N.L.R.B. 812 (1965).
90 150 N.L.R.B. 598 (1964).
91 156 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 1966 CCH LAB. L. Rap. Y 20,180.
92 Id. at 25,406.
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plant offices.

3

Moreover, while denying the union's request for reconsideration

of a Board rule prohibiting unions from talking to employees on company time
and property, the Board asserted it was interested, but would defer such reconsideration "until after the effects of Excelsior become known."9
3.

Management Communication With Employees
At the same time, the Board appears to restrict employers in their communications with the employees during union organization, banning discussions
that have always been regarded as protected free speech, notwithstanding section 8(c) of the act.95 Thus, reversing its earlier decisions, the Board now holds
that many previously privileged communications concerning statements of fact
and expressions of opinion are coercive and may be unfair labor practices or
grounds for upsetting an election.9" In cases of employers with a "privileged"
no-solicitation rule forbidding solicitation during nonworking hours where the
public has access, e.g., the selling floor of a retail store, the Board now asserts
that the union may have an opportunity to reply to the employees on company
premises if the employer engages in" pre-election communications to the em97
ployees.
4.

Bargaining Without Election
In addition to thus facilitating union organization, the Board has with
increasing frequency ordered employers to bargain with labor organizations
without an election and has imposed on employees a union that may not
be of the employees' own choosing. The practice strikes at the heart of the
representation procedures under section 9 of the act. In the early days of the
Wagner Act, "card checks," the practice of checking union authorization cards
against the employer's payroll, were justified by the Board under the language
of the Wagner Act that permits the Board, in determining bargaining representatives, to "take a secret ballot of employees or utilize any other suitable method
to ascertain such representatives.""8 In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947,
Congress withdrew the Board's authority to "utilize any other suitable method."
Yet the Board, under a patent distortion of the doctrine of Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,99
has held that where an employer commits alleged unfair labor practices, even
though they be insubstantial, he demonstrates a lack of good faith doubt on a
union's claim for recognition and can be ordered to bargain with the union
without an election. Joy Silk, decided in 1949, was an exception to the general
93
94

S. H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1962).
General Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 1966 CCH LAB. L. Rnp.

95

1120,181.

Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 61
Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
96 Lord Baltimore Press, 142 N.L.R.B. 328 (1963); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
1782 (1962); Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962). ,
,
.
97 May Dep't Stores, 136 N.L.R.B. 797, enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.
1964). The Board, however, still adheres to its announced rule. It does not consider a

decision of a court of appeals as binding on the issue.
98 Wagner Act, ch. 312, § 9c, 49 Stat. 453 (1935).'
99 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
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rule requiring elections, for there the employer successfully engaged in a willful
and calculated effort to destroy the union's unquestioned majority status. The
doctrine was applied to remedy outrageous and exceptional unfair labor practices. What was once the exception, however, is now rapidly becoming the rule
with the doctrine's arbitrary extension to factual situations totally unlike the
original Joy Silk case. This practice was further extended by the Bernel Foam
Prods. Co. holding,' under which the Board may order an employer to bargain with a union that lost a representation election if, according to the Board,
the employer had no "bona fide doubt' '0 of the union's alleged majority at
the time of the union's original request for recognition. Bernel Foam overruled
02
Aiello Dairy Farms,"
which had required the union to make a choice of
remedies between either an election or an unfair labor practice proceeding,
instead of having "two bites on the apple." To show a union majority under
Bernel Foam, the Board often relies on union authorization cards, which are
unreliable in showing employees' true desires.'
The vice of these Board decisions is not in the Bernel Foam principle as such, or in the original Joy Silk
doctrine, but in the Board's denial of the right of free choice to employees who
may have foisted upon them a bargaining agent not necessarily of their own
choosing, thus flouting the election procedures provided by the law.'
In Gar5
win Corp..y"
the Board appeared to go even further. Finding that the employer
committed unfair labor practices when it moved from New York to Florida,
the Board ordered the company to bargain with the union in Florida even
though there was no evidence that the union had the support of any employees
at the new location. The rights of the employees were brushed aside.
5. Codetermination
Once the bargaining relationship has been established, the pattern of
advancing union power reappears in the doctrine of codetermination, an intrusion by unions into decision-making that had always been regarded as within
the discretion of management. Before 1961, determining whether an employer's
subcontracting of bargaining unit work was an unfair labor practice turned
mainly on whether the employer's purpose was to discriminate against employees
or to avoid bargaining with a union. If economic factors prompted the subcontracting, there was no unfair labor practice.'
The Board, however, in Town
100 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 "(1964).
101 Id. at 1283.
102 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1940).
103 Purity Food Stores, 150 N.L.R.B. 1523 (1965), enforcement denied, 354 F.2d 926
(lst Cir. 1965). The court questioned the Board's not giving as pervasive effect to union
unfair labor practices in the consideration of union cards as it imposes on the company.
104 The Board's rule has been roundly condemned. See Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 417 (1965); Hearings on S. 256 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 180
(1960); Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority,
16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965); Comment, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5)
of the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Cnr. L. REv. 387 (1966).
There is hope, however, that the Board may reconsider the doctrine of these decisions. Aaron
Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 1966 OCH LAB. L. REP. f 20,437. It remains to be seen
whether this case will be followed in practice.
105 153 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 1965 CCH LA. L. REP.
9503, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
267 (1965).
106 NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
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& Country Mfg. Co.
and Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., l q' established the
doctrine that section 8 (d) of the act requires an employer to bargain about an
economic decision to subcontract bargaining unit work before subcontracting
takes place. In applying the Town & Country principle, the Board has not limited
itself to subcontracting situations but has expanded the theory to encompass
decisions to automate certain operations and terminate others,' 9 to close a
plant and cease business,' to terminate a sole remaining operation in a particular
area after a loss of clients,"1 and to sell all or part of a business." 2
6. Board Intervention to Dictate the Bargain
More recently, there seems to be a disturbing Board tendency to dictate the
bargain for the parties through broad remedial orders requiring employers to
agree to substantive terms of a collective contract. This tendency is in direct
contravention of the policy of free collective bargaining our labor legislation
seeks to promote. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp."8 the Supreme
Court declared that "the Act does not compel agreements between employers
and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever.""' 4 Again, in
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,"' the Court reiterated: "The Act does not
compel any agreement whatsoever between employees and employers. Nor does
the Act regulate the substantive terms goveming wages, hours and working
conditions which are -incorporated in an agreement."'' 6
Arguing in favor of passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the House
Committee, citing instances of contrary tendencies of the Board, was careful
to point out "that unless Congress writes into the law guides for the Board to
follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still further and seek to
control more and more the terms of collective bargaining agreements."" Congress then adopted a provision that the duty to bargain collectively "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."" This language, the Conference Report said, rejected the test of making
a concession as a factor in determining good faith, thus seeking to prevent "the
Board from determining the merits of the positions of the parties."" 9
The cases illustrate, however, that the Board considers refusals of employers
to agree to proposals or to make concessions the basis for finding refusals to
bargain. In General Elec. Co.,' the Board held that it was an unfair labor
practice for the employer to make "a 'fair and firm offer' to the unions without
107 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
108 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
109 Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
110 Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), reconsidered, 152 N.L.R.B.
619 (1965), enforcement denied and remanded, NLR.B v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,
350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
111 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964), modified,
NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
112 Weingarten Food Center, 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962).
113 301 U.S. 1 '(1937).
114 Id. at 45.
115 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
116 Id. at 402.
117 H.R. RsP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1947).
118 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 58(d) (1964).
119 H.R. RP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 34 (1947).
120 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
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holding anything back for later trading or compromising."''" In Fitzgerald
Mills Corp., 2 the Board used the employer's "adamant refusal" to enter into
a contract "except on its own terms" and its "uncompromising attitude" in
rejecting the union's demands as "evidence" of its failure to bargain in good
faith. In H. K. Porter,2 ' the Board found a refusal to bargain where the employer denied the union's request for a checkoff of union dues. The next
2 where, over
logical step followed in Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.,"
vigorous dissent, a Board majority ordered that an employer incorporate a
checkoff clause into a labor contract even though the employer bargained on
it to an impasse.
An offshoot of government intervention lies in the decisions of the Board
finding employer unfair labor practices on the grounds that the contract was
incorrectly interpreted by the employer. The Board thus imposes its own construction of a contract, instead of permitting the parties to decide the contract's
meaning.
The Board operates in this manner in the teeth of a labor policy
favoring voluntary adjustment of disputes." The Board's justification is that
it has exclusive jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practices. This reasoning is
invalid because disputes essentially concerning the interpretation of a contract
are outside the proper province of the Board."
Thus, what should be free from government intervention has come under
government control, a tendency the Board should abjure. Not only are the
decisions contrary to our basic labor policy; they upset the balance of power
needed for free bargaining to survive.
E. Union Control Over Members
1. More Power to Unions
In addition to dealing with the immediate relationship between the union
and employer, Board decisions also concern the exercise of control by unions over
their members. In this latter area, the union's control has been increased so
that the exercise of union power cannot be diluted by dissident members. The
Board has freed unions from liability for fining employees who exceed union-prescribed production quotas,"28 cross picket lines in violation of union policy, 29 file a
decertification petition with the Board, 8 ' or file a request to withdraw a union's
121 Id. at 195.
122 133 N.L.R.B. 877 '(1961).
123 153 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 1965 CGH LAB. L. REp 119556.
124 160 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 1966 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1 20,652.
125 C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414, enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1965), wherein the court quoted the language in another case with approval: "'It seems to
us that what the Board has done, under the guise of remedying unfair labor practices, is
to attempt to bestow . . . benefits which it believes the Union should have obtained but
failed to obtain ...
as a result of its collective bargaining with the respondent . .. ' " Id.
at 228. The Board, however, continues to adhere to the doctrine. Anaconda Aluminum Co.,
160 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1966 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1 20,629.
126 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 '(1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
127 Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 "(1962); Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B.
225, 240 (1948); H.R. RBP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947); cf. Speilberg Mfg.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
128 Wisconsin Motors Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).
129 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), rev'd, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1965).
130 Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
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authority to execute a union shop agreement.1 ' Although in the last two cases
the discipline imposed was expulsion from the union, the Board's rationale would
apply equally were the union to impose fines for the exercise of these statutory
rights.
In passing the Landrum-Griffin Act .in 1959, Congress recognized that
federally insured rights given .to unions carried commensurate union responsibilities and obligations to act in the public interest. The act placed procedural
and substantive duties on unions enforceable by private litigation and the Labor
Department. The Board, however, has since proceeded on an opposite course.
It has immunized union discipline of its members short of fining them for filing
unfair labor practice charges against the unions."' Apparently, the power to fine
union members may subject employees to oppressive and frequently unlimited
liability. This power is particularly unjust where the employee must join the

union against his will because of a union shop agreement permitted by section
8(a) (3). Abuse of this power is at odds with the goal of democratic unions and
the right to dissent. The Board should adhere to the philosophy stated by the
Supreme Court in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,"'3 where the Court said,
"The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational

rights."

'34

2. Less Power to the Employer
One phase of Board doctrine dramatically illustrates a tendency of the Board
both to disregard congressional policy and to cant the power balance between
management and labor. This tendency is in an area where power can be most
effective and where each party seeks to exercise all available means in pursuit
of its bargaining objectives.' In, John Brown,"'. the Board restricted the right
of employers to defend against a union "whipsaw" strike directed against one
of several members of an employers' association. In that case, five retail food
operators made up a multi-employer bargaining unit. The union struck one
store and the 'other employers locked out their employees to prevent the whipsawing tactic of the union, that is, to prevent the defeat of all employers by
applying economic pressure against each one successively until the union's goals
were realized. The Board held the lockout illegal. On appeal, the tenth circuit
denied enforcement, 3 noting that the Board had no ,right to "choose sides";
that it was not "'common sense' to require the companies to "aid and abet
the success of the whipsaw strike"; and that it would render "largely illusory" the right of lockout which the Supreme Court had declared lawful 1 l
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, admonishing the
Board "that the Act does not constitute the Board as 'arbiter of the sort of
economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their
bargaining demands.' "138
131

Pittsburgh-DesMoines Steel Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1965 CCH LAB. L. REp.

132
133

Charles S.Skura, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
347 U.S. 17 (1954).

134

Id. at 40.

135
136

137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7, (10th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).

137
138

NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 '(1965).

f
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The Board's authority was similarly misdirected in Darlington Mfg. Co.," 9
where the Board found an employer had committed unfair labor practices by
permanently closing its plant after a union election because its competitive
position "had diminished as a result of the election."' 4 The Supreme Court,"4"
in remanding the case to the Board to obtain evidence on the purpose and effect
of the closing, stated that the employer had the absolute right to terminate his
entire business for any reason he pleases and admonished the Board not to apply
such a "startling innovation.. . without the clearest manifestation of legislative
intent or unequivocal judicial precedent ...."
In HawaiiMeat Co. v. NLRB 4. and NLRB v. Robert S. Abbott Publishing
4
Co.,' the courts of appeals reversed Board findings of unfair labor practices
where employers subcontracted their work to maintain business during a strike
without first notifying or consulting with the union. The court in Abbott declared what should have been obvious to the Board:
It would be a startling doctrine indeed... to tell companies and employers
faced with extinction because of a strike, that before they can make
economic business decisions to contract out work in order to continue
operations, they must first consult the union that caused the threat of
extinction. 45
In American Ship Bldg. Co.,4" the Board found illegal a lockout utilized
by an employer to enhance his bargaining position after good-faith negotiations
resulted in an impasse. The Supreme Court reversed.'
The language of the
Court, which in essence is the theme of this article, included the following:
The Board has justified its ruling in this case and its general approach
to the legality of lockouts on the basis of its special competence to weigh
the competing interests of employers and employees and to accommodate
these interests according to its expert judgment. . . .However, we think
that the Board construes its functions too expansively when it claims
general authority to define national labor policy by balancing the competing interests of labor and management .... Indeed, the role assumed
by the Board in this area is fundamentally inconsistent with the structure
of the Act ....148
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement in American Ship Bldg., the
Board nevertheless seems to be bent on whittling away the lockout powers of
employers. In David Friedland Painting Co.,"4 9 the Board held that an employer who operated in the territorial jurisdiction of one local union violated the
act when he locked out his employees who were members of a sister local. The
latter local was on strike against an area employer association, where the em139 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
140 Id. at 243.
141 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
142 Id. at 270.
143 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
144 331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964).
145 Id. at 213.
146 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C.Cir. 1964).
147 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
148 Id. at 315, 316, 318.
149 158 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 1966 CCH LAB. REP.
20,389.
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ployer also performed work and had an economic interest in supporting other
struck employers. In denying the company's legitimate interest in the dispute,
the Board said:
To allow this collateral or indirect interest in a labor dispute to be
deemed a legitimate business interest sufficient to serve as justification for
a lockout of Respondent's own employees is to arrive at a far-reaching
result never intended by the Supreme Court in American Ship Building.
It would lead to a proliferation of the use of the lockout so as to render
it lawful in any situation where the employer making use of it against members of a certain union could arguably be affected economically by the
outcome of particular negotiations between that union and another employer. It would be an invitation to industrial chaos rather than to industrial stability which the Act is designed to foster.150
It is difficult to reconcile the rationale of the Board in this case with the
Board's holding in Television & Radio Artists (Westinghouse Broadcasting,
Inc.),51 where the "shoe was on the other foot." There it was in the union's
interest to protect the standards of another union. The Board held that a hotcargo agreement was not rendered unlawful because the union sought to protect
the wage standards of another union in another area. The Board did not raise
the apprehensions it found in David Friedland. In approving the union conduct the Board stated:
The fact that the Respondent's representative admitted that the Union
also desired to protect the wage standards of union members not working
for WINS [the employer] does not, by itself, affect the lawfulness of such
conduct. This is true because whenever a union also represents other units
of employees doing the same type of work, its conduct aimed at setting
the wage rates and protecting the work of unit employees will necessarily
have the additional and incidental effect of protecting the wage standards
of such other employees. To find that because of this additional object
the Union's conduct is secondary would mean that i most cases it would
not be1 5permissible
for a union to take action to obtain a "work-standards"
2
clause.

What was sauce for the goose in David Friedland was not sauce for the
gander in Television & Radio Artists. Thus, the Board has again reduced the
effect of the counterbalance recognized by the Supreme Court in the American
Ship Bldg. case. Even though the two cases involved dissimilar provisions of the
act, it is submitted that the rationale of the two decisions cannot be squared.1 5 '
V. Conclusion
In the interest of free collective bargaining, the Board should reconsider
its decisions augmenting the power of organized labor. The answer frequently
150 Id. at 25,843-44.
151 160 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 1966 CCH LAB. L. REP. 20,654.
152 Id. at 26,453.
153 The Board has also removed the right to lock out where the employer allegedly committed unfair labor practices prior to the lockout. Tonkin Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 110,
1966 CGH LAB. L. REP. 1120,445.
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made by Board spokesmen that Board decisions are subject to review and can
be reversed when inappropriate begs the fundamental issue, because it is the
Board that has been established as the tribunal to administer our national labor
policy. As such, the Board is given wide latitude in making its findings of fact
and in fashioning remedies; and although courts may disagree, 5 they are
admonished not to interfere where Board decisions may have support in the
record. 5 Instead, the answer lies within the Board's own capacity. It must
not succumb to the temptation to rewrite portions of our national labor law,
but must only interpret it.
As a member of the Board majority unofficially asserted, the Board is not a
"policymaking tribunal."' 56 In January 1963, this writer observed: "The present
National Labor Relations Board has relied on its own policy rather than congressional policy in interpreting the law."' 57 The Supreme Court admonished the
Board.5 in 1965 that it "construes its functions too expansively when it claims
general authority to define national labor policy .... ""', Mr. Justice Holmes,
sitting as circuit justice in Johnson v. United States, 60 stated: "The Legislature
has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed."'6 1
It is the duty of the Board to "look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design
and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail."'4 2 As the decisions of the Board demonstrate, however, this
duty has not been fulfilled.
Congress has established the policy that equality of bargaining power is a
condition for collective bargaining in a free society, and it has legislated to that
end. Into this highly sensitive labor-management complex, Board decisions,
it must be conceded, have given immunity to the abuse of union power in our
industrial life. Today, free collective bargaining is on trial. Strikes affecting the
national welfare are on the rise. The causes are many, but one of the most
significant may be traced to Board decisions that have not been in accord with
congressional intent and have given unions excessive power to impinge upon
the national interest. If the Board fails to reconsider its decisions in the light
of congressional policy, Congress must act to insure a balanced structure within
which there can be a fair interplay of collective bargaining. Only then can the
bargaining process be free to achieve peaceful and rational solutions undisturbed by the unilateral power plays resulting from an imbalance created by the
Board's distortion of the law.
154 E.g., NLRB v. Signal Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1965), where the court affirmed
150 N.L.R.B. 1162 "with considerable reluctance." See also Caribe General Elec., Inc. vNLRB, 357 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1966), 61 L.R.R.M., 2513, affirming 149 N.L.R.B. 1541 (1964).
155 Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
156 Address of Gerald A. Brown before Labor Law Section, Institute on Labor 'Law, Duke
University Law School, Feb. 9, 1962, entitled "The NLRB' on the New Frontier."
157 Browne, The National Labor Relations Board: Labor Law Rewritten, 49 A.B.A.J. 64
(1963).
158 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
159 Id. at 316.
160 163 Fed. 30 (1st Cir. 1908).
161 Id. at 32.
162 Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).

